This paper studies the mitigation of memory timing side channels, where attackers utilize contention within DRAM controllers to infer a victim’s secrets. Already practical, this class of channels poses an important challenge to secure computing in shared memory environments.

Existing state-of-the-art memory timing side channel mitigations have several key performance and security limitations. Prior schemes require onerous static bandwidth partitioning, extensive profiling phases, or simply fail to protect against attacks which exploit fine-grained timing and bank information.

Sparse matrix-sparse matrix multiplication (spMspM) is at the heart of a wide range of scientific and machine learning applications. spMspM is inefficient on general-purpose architectures, making accelerators attractive. However, prior spMspM accelerators use inner- or outer-product dataflows that suffer poor input or output reuse, leading to high traffic and poor performance.

It is well known that there are micro-architectural vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to use caches to exfiltrate secrets from a victim. These vulnerabilities exploit the fact that the attacker can detect cache lines that were accessed by the victim. Therefore, architects have looked at different forms of randomization to thwart the attacker’s ability to communicate using the cache.

A significant amount of specialized hardware has been developed for processing deep neural networks (DNNs) in both academia and industry. This article aims to highlight the key concepts required to evaluate and compare these DNN processors. We discuss existing challenges, such as the flexibility and scalability needed to support a wide range of neural networks, as well as design considerations for both the DNN processors and the DNN models themselves.

The miniaturization of semiconductor transistors has driven the growth in computer performance for more than 50 years. As miniaturization approaches its limits, bringing an end to Moore’s law, performance gains will need to come from software, algorithms, and hardware. We refer to these technologies as the “Top” of the computing stack to distinguish them from the traditional technologies at the “Bottom”: semiconductor physics and silicon-fabrication technology.

Software side channel attacks have become a serious concern with the recent rash of attacks on speculative processor architectures. Most attacks that have been demonstrated exploit the cache tag state as their exfiltration channel. While many existing defense mechanisms that can be implemented solely in software have been proposed, these mechanisms appear to patch specific attacks, and can be circumvented.

Multicore systems should support both speculative and non-speculative parallelism. Speculative parallelism is easy to use and is crucial to scale many challenging applications, while non-speculative parallelism is more efficient and allows parallel irrevocable actions (e.g., parallel I/O). Unfortunately, prior techniques are far from this goal. Hardware transactional memory (HTM) systems support speculative (transactional) and non-speculative (non-transactional) work, but lack coordination mechanisms between the two, and are limited to unordered parallelism.

Most systems that support speculative parallelization, like hardware transactional memory (HTM), do not support nested parallelism. This sacrifices substantial parallelism and precludes composing parallel algorithms. And the few HTMs that do support nested parallelism focus on parallelizing at the coarsest (shallowest) levels, incurring large overheads that squander most of their potential.

Multicore systems must exploit locality to scale, scheduling tasks to minimize data movement. While locality-aware parallelism is well studied in non-speculative systems, it has received little attention in speculative systems (e.g., HTM or TLS), which hinders their scalability.